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Abstract
Performance-based logistics (PBL) represents a support strategy for weapon systems 
and manifests in contracts that focus on the delivery of outcome performance not 
process outputs. Despite the high research interest in the underlying theory, only few 
studies address the question how PBL is actually used. Some quantitative studies have 
researched this question by evaluating the perceptions of involved management 
people. Other data, such as prices, contract terms, or performance indicators, are 
often only available in form of qualitative case studies. Therefore, the purpose of this 
research is to report on a number of PBL cases and to provide a holistic view on their 
characteristics and the effectiveness as a support strategy. The analysis identified a 
high number of more than 100 cases that are reported in the literature. Filter methods 
are used to identify heterogenous case examples. The chosen cases are described and 
analyzed considering contract terms, price mechanisms and performance indicators. 
The findings show the wide range of PBL applications in international weapon system 
support. This guides this research to a number of research and practical propositions.
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INTRODUCTION
Already in 2001 the Department of Defense of the United States of America 
(US-DoD) described performance-based logistics as the “preferred approach to 
product support” (US-DoD, 2001, p. 4). Since then, PBL has been used to increase 
availability and reliably of weapon systems while sustainment costs were stabilized 
or even reduced (Lucyshyn and Rigilano, 2019). A couple of studies already 
evaluated the effectiveness of PBL and provide empirical evidence on the positive 
effects of PBL, when properly implemented (e.g. Gansler and Lucyshyn, 2006; 
Guajardo et al., 2012; Boyce and Banghart, 2012; Lucyshyn et al., 2016).
 PBL changes the traditional “pay for parts and services” approach of weapon 
system support towards a contract that is linked to expected performance outcomes 
(Mooney and Sanders, 2018). The details of the PBL approach are reviewed below, 
but what is of interest here is that PBL is not only a topic for the US-DoD. Since its 
emergence, the concept is used and implemented by a number of other countries. 
In particular, the United Kingdom or Australia are mentioned with specific 
incentive strategies that support PBL effectiveness (Mooney and Sanders, 2018). 
Case examples are reported from Germany (Kleemann et al., 2013), India bought 
Rafale fighter jets from France with PBL support (Walia, 2019), and the concept is 
also discussed in the context of Nordic countries (Listou et al., 2019).
 The first passages of this article refer to the effectiveness of PBL and its 
applicability to various contexts. This reasoning is generally positive. However, 
some PBL pitfalls exist. First, PBL in the US-DoD is backed and encouraged for 
many years, but PBL contracting in the USA is still relatively rare and PBL contract 
numbers appear to decline since its peak in 2005 (Lucyshyn and Rigilano, 2019; 
Mooney and Sanders, 2018). This could be a warning signal that despite empirical 
evidence of PBL effectiveness, the concept might be outdated or at least the 
“hype around PBL” has reached a peak. The question is, if this is due to a lack of 
effectiveness.
 Second, studies revealed that PBL is implemented in quite different ways (Glas et 
al., 2013). Thus, there is not only “one” PBL, but several configuration alternatives. 
For example, US DoD uses financial incentives in form of financial rewards or 
penalties, but also uses PBL in form of fixed-price contracts and surprisingly even 
cost-plus or pain-gain-share agreements (Hunter et al., 2018). Besides financial 
incentives, also time-based incentives are applied, because for a supplier the 
continuation of a business relationships is a main issue. This incentive is found to 
be a primary PBL incentive in some countries, e.g. Australia (Hunter et al., 2018). 
Overall, the diversity of PBL configuration alternatives might confuse and provokes 
the question which configuration fits best to a specific weapon system.
 Both aspects guide this article to investigate how PBL is actually used. As 
already mentioned, some studies have researched this question (e.g. Lucyshyn and 
Rigilano, 2019). Often studies focus on the perceptions of involved management 
people (e.g. Glas and Kleemann, 2017; Gelderman et al., 2017). In addition, 
contract data of defense projects, such as prices, contract terms, incentives or 
performance indicators, are hardly available. This is why this article focuses on 
reported qualitative case studies. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to report 




and the effectiveness as a support strategy. By applying this method, this research 
investigates the following research questions in accordance with case study research 
approaches (Yin, 2014). The first research question is addressing the effectiveness 
of PBL incentives, while the second question is focusing on time dynamics of PBL 
development.
    RQ1: Why incentives lead to an increase in effectiveness in the PBL case?
    RQ2: Why usage of PBL may have stalled and how will its application   
      develop in the future?
 Effectiveness is a measure for how well a goal is achieved. PBL usually aims 
at achieving performance goals which are operationalized with indicators such as 
availability, reliability, robustness, lead time etc. (Glas et al., 2018). This work is fo- 
cusing on effectiveness, not on efficiency. Efficiency is measure for how much effort 
is required to achieve a goal. Already by its name PBL is performance-oriented. Thus, 
it is plausible to examine PBL from an effectiveness perspective. If effectiveness is 
not achieved, any other discussion about efficiency would be obsolete.
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We first give insights into 
PBL and its main characteristics in section 2. Next, the applied methodology of 
case study research is explained in section 3. This is followed by the case insights 
in section 4. Section 5 combines the insights to a meta-perspective. This is also the 
basis for the discussion and implications section 6. Finally, we provide conclusions 
and give details on limitations in section 7.
PERFORMANCE BASED LOGISTICS IN WEAPON SYSTEM 
SUPPORT
 In weapon systems support, PBL is often sold as a completely new approach. 
However, roots of the approach can be traced back to the 1960s (Glas et al., 2013). 
Research is addressing the phenomenon, but the discussion uses several terms 
to describe it: “performance contracting”; “outcome-based contracting”; “perfor- 
mance-based logistics”; “performance-based payment”; “availability-contracting”; 
“incentive contracting” etc. (Selviaridis, 2011; Glas et al., 2013).
 The essence of PBL stands for “outcomes are acquired through performance-
based arrangements that deliver [weapon system] requirements and incentivize 
product support providers to reduce costs through innovation” (Defense 
Acquisition University, 2016, p. 6). The outcome is usually defined in form of met- 
rics (e.g. availability, reliability, operability). In PBL we see a separation between 
the performance expectations (outcome goal), and the supplier´s way of imple- 
mentation and how this goals is achieved (Kim et al., 2007). Thus, supplier efforts 
must focus on the achievement of the given goals. “The key to a successful PBL 
arrangement is the use of incentives to elicit desired behaviors and outcomes from 
the [supplier…]” (Defense Acquisition University, 2016, p. 11).
 Every contract is providing a specific form of incentive to a supplier. Recent 
research, following Hunter (2018), has shown that in PBL financial incentives, but 
also time-based, scope-based or relational/other incentives are feasible. Thus, PBL 
includes monetary reward or penalty systems (bonus/malus payments), but also 
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incentives that are related to the extension of a contract duration or the extension 
of the contract size and scope. This research work is fully aware that incentives in a 
contract are a complex topic. The insights into the cases will show that time-based 
incentives (e.g. options for additional contract duration) are used together with 
financial incentives. However, this article focuses on financial incentives and tries 
to evaluate how these incentives effect supplier behavior.
 Supplier behavior then leads to contract outcomes. The contract outcomes in 
PBL are often not only influenced by the supplier. Other influencing factors are sim- 
ply how often, how intense and under which conditions weapon systems are used. 
Nevertheless, outcomes are measured via performance indicators that are related to 
requirements in the contract. These metrics are availability, reliability, operability 
and Glas et al. (2018, table II and III) provide overviews with already used key 
performance indicators. Management control is also an (relational) incentive.
 However, it is assumed that financial incentives which are linked to performance 
metrics are the main source for motivation effects on supplier behavior. It is stated 
that the most challenging element of a PBL is the pricing model (University of 
Tennessee and Supply Chain Visions, 2012). This is why the focus in this article is 
on financial incentives.
METHODOLOGY OF CASE ANALYSIS
Brief insights into case study research
 This research applies case study research as the major methodology. A case study 
is defined as an “empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
(the "case") in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the bound- 
aries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident” (Yin, 2014, p. 
16.). Thus, it is the aim to better understand the phenomenon in its context. 
 This suits very well to the topic of PBL, which is a phenomenon often discussed 
as a single concept or strategy, but in fact it has a diversity of configurational 
alternatives. Furthermore, weapon systems and weapon system support systems 
differ from country to country. Therefore the exploration of PBL through case 
study research is justified.
 Often case study research is examining a single case. However multiple-case 
design have increased in frequency in recent years and according to Yin (2014) 
multiple-case designs have specific advantages in comparison to single case 
studies and in comparison to quantitative survey. First, the evidence derived from 
multiple cases is perceived more robust and external validity is enhanced. Second, 
multiple cases allow to cross-evaluate and combine findings. In contrast to multiple 
respondents in a survey, insights from multiple cases is not testing a cause-effect, 
but allows to examine a cause-effect in-depth in different contexts. The examination 
of a phenomenon in multiple cases is also called replication design.
 This suits very well to the aims of this research. PBL is an innovation as it provides 
new approaches to weapon system support. Countries /armed forces adopt PBL for 
individual weapons systems in a specific manner and in a specific configuration 
setting. Therefore, each PBL can be subject of an individual case study, but the 
study as a whole covers several PBL and thus uses a multiple case design (see also 




PBL case population: An initial quantitative view
 Before examining cases in order to address the research questions, this section 
focuses on the overall population of PBL cases, of which data is available. PBL has 
its routes in the USA, so we have a strong look on the situation in the USDoD. PBL 
is described as the preferered product support strategy, but surprisingly “PBL is not 
being aggressively pursued” (Lucyshyn and Rigilano, 2019, p. 345). The number of 
PBL has decreased since its peak in 2005 of around 200 PBLs in place to around 
half the number of 87 PBLs in 2012 (Erwin, 2013). This means that “only 5 percent 
of the (US) military´s maintenance work is performed under such deals“ (Erwin, 
2013). Figure 1 shows that PBL contract obligations of the USDoD gradually 
declined after its peak in 2013 (data extracted from Hunter et al., 2017).
Figure 1: PBL contract obligations in billion US-$ (constant 2016), Data from Hunter et al. (2017)
  Besides the PBL in the USDoD, the author of this article has identified in his 
research another 100 PBL contracts. The collection of cases was an initial step of 
this research approach. Of these cases, some are from the public sector (e.g. police 
equipment, rail maintenance, infrastructure), but there are also PBL for weapon 
systems in other countries. The cases have been identified through publications 
in academic journals (e.g. Priva Datta, 2011 with two cases on aircraft spares or 
Kleemann and Eßig, 2013 with five cases). However, most cases are only presented 
with vague or very limited data. This prohibits a quantitative cross-case analysis 
with all cases.
 However, both figures (87 reported contracts of the USDoD and 100 identified 
international cases from the literature) point to the same issue: In face of hundreds 
or thousands of other contracts (it is mentioned above that PBL in the USA has a 
share of 5%), PBL seems to be a niche approach, as the number of contracts is rela- 
tively low. This fits to the argument that each PBL is unique and PBL is customized 
because “one size does not fit all” (Geary and Vitasek, 2008; Glas et al., 2013).
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 The configuration of PBL depends on how incentives are understood (Mooney 
and Sanders, 2018). Some voices acknowledge that every contract provides a 
specific incentive structure, but propose to focus the PBL discussion on contracts 
that use a bonus/malus payment scheme (Glas et al., 2013). Other voices describe 
PBL as an approach that can use the whole range of price mechanisms: Cost plus, 
(firm) fixed price, and incentive price scheme (Lucyshyn and Rigilano, 2019, p. 
350). Through the incentive mechanism, a PBL supplier is getting a specific 
profit opportunity and takes over a specific amount of contract risk. Therefore, 
the understanding of incentives is crucial for PBL. Data on the use of incentive 
schemes show that the majority of PBL in USDoD are firm fixed price (68% of all 
contracts, Hunter et al., 2017). Besides the payments scheme, there are also time-
based or relational incentives available to configure PBL. Contract continuation 
and more intense cooperation are to mention here. However, those incentives are 
often not strong, because the level of competition for PBL contracts is low. Hunter 
et al. (2017) showed that 78 percent of USDoD PBL contract obligations have been 
awarded without competition. In a single source situation contract continuation 
for weapon system support is not a strong incentive, because the supplier is more 
or less set. Competitors are often not entering the market, because they would 
need to establish a new supply chain. Therefore, the core configuration variable 
of a PBL is the price incentive mechanism and this research will show how this is 
executed in the cases. Obviously, suppliers in a non-competitive market are risk 
averse, thus reluctant to PBL. Defense acquisition officials are also risk averse. Thus 
the implementation of the incentive structure is a key challenge than needs to be 
overcome as a good PBL should be in the interest of both parties.
 The initial quantitative view on PBL cases reveals that PBL is seemingly a niche 
strategy for weapon system support, while on the other hand there is a range of 
configurational alternatives to form PBL. The major variable is the price incentive 
mechanism. Both aspects (niche strategy and PBL diversity) might explain, why the 
literature is still fragmented and most research addresses the topic with abstract 
mathematical modeling or in-depth single case study methodologies (Selviaridis 
and Wynstra, 2015).
PBL case selection
 Following the multi-case study research design, it is the purpose to select cases 
that have the same phenomenon, of course, but differ in their context and content. 
Yin (2014, p. 58) recommends to select around 4 cases or more to investigate 
contrasting insights for assumed cause-effects. The guiding two research questions 
aim clearly to explore different and contrasting reasons, why incentives increase 
effectiveness of weapon system support and why PBL implementation has stalled.
 To get valid and objective answers, the selection of cases in multiple-case study 
research designs is quite similar to how an experiment is designed. In a series 
of an experiment several observations are taken with a dependent variable that 
is influenced by independent variables. In an experiment some observations are 
taken without and some with a change in the independent variables (stimulus). If 
the dependent variable changing, then the experiment has shown the cause-effect 
form the stimulus to the dependent variable. Similarly, case selection in multiple 
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case study designs aims to identify cases that have clearly different contexts and 
case contents. Then, it might be possible to identify reasons why results in the cases 
differ, because the differentiating factors are known.
 The following figure 2 illustrates the chosen cases. It is depicted that case 
background is located either in the USA or in Germany. Besides, the level of 
application differs and ranges from parts/components to the system level. In 
addition, the case context differ, because object of analysis (recipient of PBL 
service) is also heterogenous and ranges from single to multiple aircraft fleets and 
also includes a land-based rocket launcher system. Furthermore, the case content 
also differs. Contract duration and incentive structures as well as fleet size and 
other characteristics differ. The characteristics of each case are presented in more 
detail in the analysis section. 
Figure 2: Cases and contexts analyzed in this research.
PBL case data
 Data for the case analysis has been collected by means of literature analysis. For 
each case at least one major source of information has been identified. The data 
presented in the source is enriched with other data from academic literature on the 
same case. General data of the weapon system and on its usage life-cycle are also 
added from other publications. Overall, this research did not collect primary data 
on the cases, e.g. through interviews, observations or other empirical methods. 
Data gathering is following the analysis of secondary data.
 Secondary data is the analysis of data that was collected by someone else 
for another purpose (Johnston, 2014). The use of existing data provides several 
opportunities for researchers, e.g. saving of time and resources but also simply 
getting access to a specific phenomenon. This is relevant here, because research 
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in defense economics is generally challenged by confidentiality requirements 
and limited data access. However, analyzed secondary data had initially another 
focus. Therefore, “secondary analysis of data requires a systematic process that 
acknowledges challenges of utilizing existing data” (Johnston, 2014, p. 625).
 This research generally follows the generic procedure according to Johnston 
(2014): (1) Develop the research questions, (2) Identifying the dataset, (3) Evalu- 
ating the dataset and assessing the quality with regards to consistency, reliability, 
validity, objectivity.
CASE PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
Case 1: Navy Aircraft Tires
 This case refers to Navy aircraft tires. The major source of information of this 
case is the report of Lucyshyn and Rigliano (2019). The case context has been 
enriched with other publicly available sources.
 Traditionally, aircraft tires have been bought in bulk on basis of contracts for 
individual types of tires. Then, the tires were stored until they were needed, what 
resulted in large inventory stocks. On the other hand, specific tires still were scarce 
and stock-out was a severe risk. Tire availability was 81% before entering into the 
PBL, what was perceived as a severe bottleneck.
 The Navy developed and implemented a PBL on component level. It started 
with an initial firm-fixed price contract starting in April 2001 and now lasts on 
until today. Contract duration was five-years with two five-years options. The first 
supplier, Michelin Aircraft Tires Corporation, was responsible to supply all types 
of aircraft tires that the Navy used. The contract had two extensions in 2005 and in 
2010, so the PBL contract ended in 2016 after 15 years. The follow-up contract was 
competitively awarded to another supplier, Lockheed Martin. It was also a firm-
fixed price contract and contract duration of three years with two options of six 
months each. Contract values have been $67.4 million (1st phase), $92 million (2nd 
phase), $101 million (3rd phase), and $131.3 million (4th phase with new supplier).
 The contract requirements were to achieve a 95% on-time fill rate within 48 
hours in the US and within 96 hours outside the US, while also other objectives 
are mentioned, e.g. reduction of inventories, demand flexibility of up to twice the 
monthly demand rate, if required. 
 The source provides data, that the contract was effective, because all requisitions 
were filled. In 2011 over 289,000 tires have been delivered worldwide and the 
supplier Michelin Aircraft Tires Corporation managed to consistently exceed the 
on-time delivery metric with a level of around 98.5%. Customer wait time was 
32.1 hours within the US and 59.5 hours outside the US. Also Lockheed Martin 
managed to exceed the on-time delivery metric consistently with 98.2% within the 
US and 98.7% outside the US.
 To achieve the set contract requirements, suppliers established specific man- 
agement and execution structures, e.g. data exchange was established that allowed 
real-time demand status monitoring. Also, a service center that is available 24/7 was 
established. Besides, a monitoring system was established that provided insights 





 These are indications that the supplier is incentivized through the firm-fixed 
price to invest in reliability improvements, thereby reducing future costs. But the 
incentive is framed by the contract duration. “Generally, PBL contracts of shorter 
duration will not incentivize significant contractor investment since the contract 
must be long enough for the contractors to recoup their investments” (Lucyshyn 
and Rigliano, 2019, p. 368).
Case 2: Spares availability
 The next case refers to the weapon system EUROFIGHTER and a specific 
support contract. The major source of information for this case is a joint position 
paper of the German aerospace industry association (abbreviated BDLI) and the 
German Bundeswehr (BLDI, 2018). However, presented data to the case is limited 
in that source. Besides, additional information to the case context is given by 
several reports of the German-Ministry of Defense (D-MoD), e.g. D-MoD (2019 
and 2020).
 Traditionally, the responsibility for all tasks related to the supply of the weapon 
system with parts and components was on the side of the German Bundeswehr. 
These tasks included the management of parts and components, procurement, 
storage, transport, and the planning and monitoring of the cycle of replacement 
parts. Other countries that use the weapon system have specific support contracts 
in place, which focus on availability. In particular, the United Kingdom awarded 
in 2009 a “contracting for availability” PBL support for their fleet to BAE systems 
(BAE Systems, 2020). That support in the UK also comprises logistics services such 
as the monitoring and management of all day-to-day operations to deliver spares 
and repair services (BAE Systems, 2012). The German Bundeswehr was confronted 
with challenges in the supply of the weapon system. Official publications mention 
“problems in the operational readiness” (D-MoD, 2015) and public media frankly 
talk about lacking spare parts (Gebauer, 2015). Thus, the Bundeswehr implemented 
a PBL contract to address this problem.
 The contract (Eurofighter Vertrag C#3) has a duration of five years, but the 
source from 2018 mentions that the PBL just has been started. The contract 
situation is still in the transition phase. The supplier is taking over all supply chain 
management task (transport, storage, repair and overhaul of replacement parts). 
The contract requirements were to meet a material availability KPI, which is 
measured in response time frames of one hour, one day and 30 days. Within the 
30-days timeframe, the objective is set to achieve a material availability of 99%. 
Similar to the above mentioned approach in United Kingdom, the contractor is 
also providing services on air force bases with own personnel. The main source 
of information is not providing any indications how the payment and incentive 
scheme is implemented in the case. But there are some general remarks on PBL 
in that paper: “It is ideal solution for PBL to link outcome-oriented KPIs with 
economic incentives” (BDLI, 2018, p. 7). Following the classification that the 
EUROFIGHTER-PBL is seen as PBL in the narrower sense, it is assumed that there 
is a reward scheme implemented in the case (bonus linked to material availability).
 Overall, the case shows positive effects of PBL. In an official report, the 
Bundeswehr states that PBL in the EUROFIGHTER case has significantly in- 
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creased the availability of ready for operation aircrafts (D-MoD, 2020, p. 9). More 
specifically, that report mentions that the EUROFIGHTER fleet saw an increase in 
the fleet availability ratio of +60% (D-MoD, 2020, p. 4).
Case 3: Turn-around-time
 This case refers to a rocket launcher weapon system called HIMARS (High-
mobility Artillery Rocket System). The major source of information for describing 
the case is the report of Lucyshyn and Rigliano (2019).
 HIMARS entered prototype production in 1999 and series production in 2003. 
The system is referred to as the most advanced artillery system in the U.S. arsenal. 
It is a wheeled and thus very mobile rocket launcher on basis of an armored 
truck. Already in 2004, when the first HIMARS launchers entered into service, 
a first PBL contract has been awarded by the Army to Lockheed Martin (around 
195 launchers), while HIMARS at the Marine Corps (around 40 launchers) was 
supplied outside that contract. The objective of the PBL was to optimize or reduce 
costs while having flexibility in operational requirements. Compared to the weapon 
system support for the preceding system M270 MLRS, inventory management, 
reserve stock, repair and overhaup, depot maintenance etc., was not executed by 
the military, but by the PBL supplier.
 The first HIMARS contract had a duration of three years (one base year and 
three option years). The volume was $96 million. In a second contract, Army and 
Marines systems were supported. That contract lasted for three years (one base 
year with two option years) and had a volume of $90 million. A third contract 
extended the PBL support until 2014 and had a volume of 158 million. Then, 
USDoD decided to transition weapon system support for HIMARS to a traditional 
cost-plus contract. This transition is of peculiar interest.
 The supplier took over the full support responsibility. This included on the 
one hand side even the optimization of HIMARS usage. Data analysis revealed 
already in the first contract, that HIMARS launchers are used very different. 
Categorization in less used systems with low operational support tempo, and more 
used systems with high operational support tempo helped to reduce costs. On the 
other hand, the supplier efforts also referred to personnel embedded at military sits 
(called field service representatives). That personnel had a number of tasks, but a 
major advantage was to repair HIMARS very quick. Branded “Fix Forward”, field 
representatives repaired around 50% of all HIMARS on-site. In addition, logistics 
costs were saved, because field representatives were trained to open replacement 
components. So only parts or components need to be shipped instead of the whole 
replacement component.
 The PBL was a firm-fixed price contract with performance incentives for state- 
side operations. If performance requirements were met, an additional fee was paid 
to the contractor. For overseas operations a cost-plus fixed fee contract was used.
 The PBL contract contained three metrics: system readiness, response time for 
part delivery, and repair turnaround time. System readiness objective was 92% in 
the first contract, and 90% in the second one. This metric was not include in the 
third contract. Delivery time was measured in percent of delivered parts within a 
timeframe and priority group. For example, demands in in priority group 1 had to 
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be fulfilled within 48 hours within USA and 96 hours outside USA in more than 
92% of cases (see Lucyshyn and Rigliano, 2019 for more details).
 The third metric is of peculiar interest here. It is turnaround time and specified 
the time period for completing repairs for replacement parts. The requirement was 
set in working days (see table 1). In other words, 65% of all replacement parts have 
a turnaround time less than 36 days, and 92% of all replacement parts a turnaround 
time less than 80 days.
 Overall, it seems as if the PBL was successful. System readiness was 99%. 
Spare parts delivery time was 14 hours within the USA and thus far below the 
requirement of 48 hours. Turnaround time in the field (by the field representative) 
took 1.2 days, only. Repairs at the site of the supplier took on average 34 days. 
The source of information also reports on calculations which measured total cost 
avoidance – only due to improved planning of operational tempo. Cost avoidance 
was $8.6 million. Therefore, the contract seemed to be a success.
 The major source of information further explains how and why the contract 
was changed towards cost-plus. This is also of peculiar interest for RQ2. It is 
mentioned that USDoD aimed to have more control. Direct control over stocks by 
the government and given stock objectives should help to achieve this. However, 
the source also provides some indication that supplier lost flexibility by this new 
arrangement (no optimized order quantities with sub-suppliers, no incentive to 
further invest into the program). Nevertheless, the source also acknowledges that 
performance under the cost plus agreement is still good. All metric requirements 
are (still) on a high level.
Case 4: Training helicopter
 This case refers to the training helicopter system EC135 of the Bundeswehr and 
its support contract with the industry. The major source of information originates 
in a reader book on PBL from 2014 (Eßig and Glas, 2014) with specific chapters 
that describe the case (Haindl and Hänger, 2014; Muntz, 2014). Similar to case 2, 
additional information is added from reports of the German Ministry of Defense.
Band Repair turnaround time
Requirement
(percentage of total repairs)
1 1-7 days ≥18%
2 8-35 days ≥47%
3 36-80 days ≤27%
4 81-90 days ≤8%
5 91 days 1%
Table 1: Metric calculation in the rocket launcher case (data from Lucyshyn and Rigliano, 2019).
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 The helicopter fleet of 14 EC135 is located at one training center location. 
The helicopter is not for combat training but basic training, thus EC135 is also a 
commercial helicopter with around 1,000 systems sold in the world. The problem in 
this case was, that the budget for the operation of aircraft fleets in the Bundeswehr 
is of course limited. Even if the budget increases over time, it often does not keep 
pace with the general cost increase (Muntz, 2014, p. 170). A solution to the problem 
for the Bundeswehr was to concentrate on core tasks and efficiently execute non-
core tasks. Training helicopters such as the EC135 are not within the core tasks, this 
is why Bundeswehr searched for a solution to economize costs while at the same 
time have the helicopters available in a very flexible manner.
 The solution was a PBL contract in which the industry, namely Eurocopter 
(today Airbus helicopters), takes over the whole responsibility for the helicopter 
fleet. This included spare supply management, maintenance, repair and overhaul, 
tooling, inspections, documentation and other tasks. Only fuel-filling and usage 
(flying) are tasks that are performed by military personnel. All support processes 
are at the supplier side. The contract started in 2005 and had an initial duration 
of five years. In several extensions (five years, five years, seven years), the contract 
is now agreed until 2022. The contract payment scheme is “pay-per-unit”, a fixed 
price per flight hour (BDLI, 2018).
 Overall, performance of the training helicopter is positively mentioned in the 
sources. The long-term ratio of mission-ready aircraft provision is above 80% 
(D-MoD, 2020). In a specific analysis, the ratio goes up to 99.4%, when not executed 
missions due to bad weather conditions or illness of pilots are not regarded (Haindl 
and Hänger, 2014). But the main objective was also to economize fleet operation 
costs. Information on this issue are rare, but Haindl and Hänger (2014) mention, 
that costs are far below (-50%) compared to the costs for a flight hour of the pre- 
vious training helicopter BO-105. Thus, also this case shows positive effects of PBL.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Cross-case comparison
 Before we discuss the findings, this section summarizes the cases and provides a 
meta-view. Overall, the case analysis shows four PBL examples, two from Germany, 
and two from the USA. Case selection focuses on two PBL examples on parts/
components level and two examples on system level.
 In every case, a severe initial bottleneck situation is mentioned and the PBL 
approach shall address this issue. For navy aircraft tires and the spares availability 
case, the bottleneck is the low availability of spares, while stocks are existent but 
often not with material that suits demand. A different bottleneck exists for the 
other two cases. There, new systems are introduced and PBL shall help to avoid or 
at least stabilize weapon system support costs on the one hand side. On the other 
hand, PBL shall provide an instrument to safeguard a high contract performance 
even in changing conditions. In both cases, flexibility is provided and incentivized.
 The cases from the USA show long overall contract duration with many 
contracts or contract option. In case one, two contracts with three options are 




contracts and the first two contracts with an additional option. This is an indication 
that time-based incentives are also used to motivate the supplier, not only financial 
incentives. The same can be seen in the German cases, however, single contract 
terms are not below 5 years.
 Every PBL has an key performance indicator, which is operationalized in several 
aspects. Navy aircraft tires measures on-time-delivery in hours and differentiate 
the area (USA, non-USA). In the EUROFIGHTER case, material availability is 
differentiated in three timeframes (one-hour, one-day, 30-days). The cases with 
the rocket launcher is the only one in this sample that uses several KPIs (system 
readiness, response time for part delivery, and turn-around time).
 The KPIs are linked to a specific contract type/price mechanism. The range 
is from firm-fixed price (navy aircraft tires) to pay-per-unit-price (training heli- 
copter), while the other two cases add financial incentives to other price mecha- 
nisms. All regarded cases are perceived as effective and successful. Three PBL are 
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Table 2. Overview on the four cases.
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Implications referring to RQ1: PBL incentives and effectiveness
 Referring to the first research question, why and how incentives lead to an 
increase in effectiveness, the findings from the PBL cases support previous 
observations in academic and practice literature on the topic. First of all, it is to 
state that all observed cases have been effective. This is not surprising. Typically, 
PBL are reported as successful. E.g. Defense Acquisition University (2016) reports 
on 21 analyzed PBL, of which 20 have been effective and the sole program without 
improvements is marked with a footnote that malperformance is not due to the 
PBL arrangement, but due to other causes. The US Governmental Accounting 
Office published several critical reports on PBL, but usually it criticized badly 
implemented PBL (without good business case analysis, GAO, 2008) or the 
criticism was too early. In 2005 a report of GAO mentions that only 1 out of 15 
analyzed programs showed improvements.
 As we see in our case of the navy aircraft tires, it took quite a while in the case 
to achieve the performance goals. But overall, sources from the US indicate that 
PBL is effective. In the same manner, the German MoD is arguing. Considering 
the political tenor of the report, the preliminary conclusion to PBL is very positive 
(D-MoD, 2020). It is stated that PBL is another possibility to increase the operational 
availability of weapon systems. Furthermore that report clearly points out that PBL 
was successful for all mentioned cases in that report (e.g. EUROFIGHTER, engine 
NH90 helicopter, EC135 training helicopter, LUH SOF helicopter). This provides a 
clear indication that PBL is not only effective in the USA but also in Germany.
 Overall, it seems as if the use of incentives and management by outcome-
objectives is key for PBL effectiveness. However, we see that it is not only a financial 
incentive that is of relevance. Only two cases use these bonus systems. The other 
cases use fixed prices and link them with the effectiveness ratio. Combined with 
time-based incentives (contract extensions), this is also a suitable approach to 
incentivize a supplier to improve its PBL services for the Armed Forces.
Implications referring to RQ2: The future of PBL
 Referring to the second research question, why the usage of PBL may have 
stalled and how its application will develop in the future, we have two different 
observations. To answer this question, we also refer to the “hype” and “business 
maturity” – issues that are used to assess new technologies or new business concepts 
(Fenn and Roskino, 2009; Dedehayir et al., 2016).
 In the USA, only few percent of the (US) military´s maintenance work is 
performed under PBL (Erwin, 2013). Recent studies indicate that PBL is required, 
because there is still demand for reliable technology. However, PBL is not being 
aggressively pursued throughout the USDoD (Lucyshyn and Rigliano, 2019). 
However, it is the “preferred approach to product support” (US-DoD, 2001, p. 
4). Overall, it seems as if PBL was and still is a niche strategy for specific weapon 
system (support challenges).
 Challenges for PBL come from two main directions: First, criticism in early 
PBL-days focused on a potentially higher risk of security of supply and reliability 




even operated in very dynamic conditions and companies did not per refuse to 
further support them. “PBL-supported systems operating in stressful environments 
have met or exceeded performance requirements” (Lucyshyn and Rigliano, 2019, 
p. 346). Second, critics of PBL focus a bit more on the effectiveness and efficiency 
of that weapon support strategy. This is in line with the reasoning mentioned by 
Selviaridis and Wynstra (2015), who question if performance-based incentives in 
long-term contract relationships are sustainable over time, because supplier ability 
to learn and to use innovation for service improvements become more and more 
marginal. That logic is convincing, because often the initial situation is characterized 
by very severe bottlenecks. Thus, PBL can achieve high initial improvements. As 
PBL is applied in the USA for more than 15 years, now, the question is, if PBL must 
achieve continuous improvements or sustainable high performance. If the latter is 
possible, then PBL is not stalled but focuses in its application fields of challenging 
niches of weapons system support.
 In Germany, PBL is of course a niche strategy. The German MoD reports on only 
four explicit PBL applications for weapon system support, out of 68 major weapon 
systems (D-MoD, 2020). Referring only to these figures, then 5.8% of all weapon 
system support contracts are PBL in Germany, but there might be a dark figure of 
unreported cases (at subsystem level or for systems not counted as major weapon 
system. However, the PBL niche strategy is gaining momentum in Germany as it is 
considered as a future solution for industrial weapon system support in the German 
military aerospace strategy (D-MoD, 2016). Considering the high variability of the 
availability ratio per weapon system (new systems between 30% and 93%), mature 
systems (60 to 100%) and old systems (26 to 89%) it seems as if there are still 
weapon systems with significant deficiencies in their availability, what could be a 
starting point for a PBL weapon system support approach. There are no indications 
that Germany already reached a “peak” or “stalled” PBL implementation. Contrary, 
more and more official documents refer to PBL and recent papers explicitly give 
top-level support. For example, the German Air Force strategy (D-MoD, 2016) 
states that PBL is ground-breaking and international PBL experiences are paving 
the path.
 Coming back to “hype” and “business maturity”, one could say that PBL in USA 
has still strong support, but the initial hype is over. On the other hand, PBL gained 
a higher level of business maturity. Methods and instruments to plan, arrange, 
execute, and monitor PBL are in place in the USA, e.g. PBL guidebook (Defense 
Acquisition University, 2016). This is why PBL is focusing on more specific fields of 
application, there. In Germany, it seems to be the other way round. PBL is gaining 
momentum, it is in a “hype”. On the other hand, PBL in Germany profits from 
foreign experiences. Business maturity of German PBL is quite high and similar 
to other international examples. Overall, German “enthusiasts” and USA “realists” 
have different perceptions of PBL to solve generally weapon system support 
problems, but in the USA as well as in Germany PBL still gains business maturity 
relevance or popularity (Stanley-Lockman, 2020). The findings of this analysis 




 This article reports on PBL, if and why it is effective and if PBL is also a concept 
for the future. The case examples show that PBL is implemented in a heterogeneous 
way, what is named as PBL concept diversity. Nevertheless, all cases are effective, 
even if PBL implementation is different from case to case. This is also a potentially 
interesting field for future research. Next, the analysis and discussion show that 
even after decades of PBL existence (in the USA), the concept still gains relevance 
for future applications. In Germany many systems still are not treated with PBL, 
so only specific systems have been addressed up to now. In the USA, availability 
problems of a range of systems have been addressed in the past, so the future of PBL 
could address in more focused and sharpened application for more challenging 
performance objectives.
 However, this research is also facing a number of limitations. First, empirical basis 
is limited with only four cases and each case builds on main sources of information. 
Second, the observed PBL may represent sub-types. More cases would enable a 
more fine-grained analysis on incentives and their effectiveness. Third, most cases 
are from aircrafts and only one case is from a ground-based system. A navy case is 
missing. Fourth, most PBL are very long-term projects. Every evaluation of their 
effectiveness is biased by time dynamics. Overall, future research should further 
investigate and elaborate the main finding of this work: PBL is effective, but it is a 
niche strategy for which the concept has a future!
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